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Abstract
Motivated by epidemics such as COVID-19, we study the spread of a contagious disease
when people change their behavior to respond to the disease prevalence. We extend the
SIR epidemiological model to include endogenous meeting rates. Individuals benefit from
economic activity, but higher activity also leads to more interactions with potentially infected
individuals. The main focus is a theoretical analysis of the contagion dynamics. In the
leading case, the infection prevalence is single-peaked. We obtain a simple condition for when
several types of public-health interventions or changes in disease prevalence will paradoxically
increase infection rates due to risk compensation. This condition implies that public-health
interventions are most likely to be undermined by increased economic activity near the peak
of severe diseases.
∗Harvard University. Email: krishnadasaratha@gmail.com
1 Introduction
In severe epidemics such as COVID-19, the spread of contagious diseases depends substan-
tially on behavioral and policy responses. Standard epidemiological models predict diseases
paths under several assumptions on social distancing, and outcomes usually differ dramat-
ically across these scenarios.1 Given the very large impact of mitigation measures such as
social distancing on infection dynamics, understanding how much people will interact is an
important open question (Funk et al., 2015).
This paper studies the spread of a disease and the resulting behavioral responses ana-
lytically. To analyze the spread of a diseases and the accompanying behavioral responses,
we adapt the widely-used SIR epidemiological model to allow individuals to choose activity
levels at each point in time. Higher activity levels correspond to actions such as going to
work or school which provide economic and social benefits. On the other hand, higher ac-
tivity also leads to more interactions with potentially infected individuals, especially when
the disease prevalence is high and whether others are more active (e.g., public spaces are
crowded). Given the shares of the population that are susceptible and infected at a given
time, individuals’ choices are determined by a simple game-theoretic framework.
We study the dynamics of the infection and the corresponding behavioral responses. The
baseline model considers rational behavior in the absence of policy interventions. In the
leading case, disease prevalence is single-peaked: the prevalence initially increases, but then
peaks and falls toward zero as behavioral responses and herd immunity slow the spread.
Part of the population will eventually be immune while others will never be infected, and
the relative sizes of these two groups depend on model parameters and potential policy
interventions. In particular, interventions to ‘flatten the curve’ can also affect the share of
the population that must be infected before herd immunity reduces a diseases’ spread to
very low levels.
With endogenous behavior, policy changes that decrease the transmission rate or the
cost of the disease can be offset by decreased social distancing. Indeed, previous models
1To give a high-profile example, in March 2020 Ferguson et al. (2020) predicted 2.2 million US deaths
from COVID-19 without increased social distancing. Their predicted death toll decreased to 1.1-1.2 million
in a mitigation scenario, and there were further reductions under a more aggressive suppression scenario.
Beyond the differences in death rates, infection dynamics look very different across the scenarios.
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(beginning with Kremer, 1996) have suggested public-health interventions to decrease trans-
missivity could actually increase infection rates. The logic is that individuals respond to a
decrease in risk by increasing activities levels, and this can increase the infection rate under
equilibrium behavior. A dynamic model lets us determine whether and when in the course
of a disease this may be the case. We identify a region, which has a simple characterization
in terms of model parameters, in which behavioral responses to various changes in policies or
disease levels are sufficiently strong to produce such paradoxical effects. This region requires
a severe disease and a high prevalence. So near the peak of a severe outbreak, public-health
interventions can be less effective or even counterproductive unless paired with attempts to
maintain social distancing. When prevalence is lower, changes such as requiring masks are
quite effective.
1.1 Related Literature
Much of behavioral epidemiology focuses on individuals’ binary choices, such as vacci-
nation, rather than more continuous choices of how much to interact with others (see
Manfredi and D’Onofrio, 2013 for several examples of models). This is especially relevant
for less severe or less contagious diseases. For example, for influenza in ordinary years, vac-
cination choices are likely the most relevant behavioral margin for most individuals. But
when individuals are engaged in substantial social distancing, choice sets are much richer.
Several models of HIV/AIDS epidemics allow individuals to choose numbers of sexual
partners (see Kremer, 1996, Auld, 2003, Greenwood, Kircher, Santos, and Tertilt, 2019, and
others). We note three key differences from our model. First, this literature treats HIV/AIDS
is treated as an endemic disease at steady state. By contrast, we argue that infection
dynamics are important for outbreaks such as COVID-19, which led to dramatic shifts in
behavior. Second, HIV/AIDS modeling uses SI rather than SIR model, as infection is an
absorbing state and there is no recovery. Third, individuals directly choose a number of
partners, i.e., the matching technology is linear rather than quadratic.2
Most recently, a number of economists have incorporated endogenous behavior into nu-
2The linear search technology drives counterintuitive findings on heterogeneity in Kremer (1996), which
shows that an increase in activity by all agents can decrease prevalence.
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merical analyses of SIR models of COVID-19. These models, such as Farboodi, Jarosch, and Shimer
(2020), Eichenbaum, Rebelo, and Trabandt (2020), Kruger, Uhlig, and Xie (2020), and Korinek and Bethune
(2020), focus largely on macroeconomic consequences of epidemics, and therefore include
additional features such as forward-looking agents and production sectors.3 While we also
conduct numerical analysis, our focus is on the theoretical properties of a related model. A
major takeaway from our analysis is that basic qualitative properties of disease dynamics and
impulse responses can be reversed by changes in model parameters. So careful calibration
and/or robustness checks are important in related numerical exercises.
2 Model
2.1 Setup
We consider a model in continuous time, indexed by t ∈ [0,∞), with a unit mass of in-
dividuals. Individuals can be susceptible, infected, or recovered. We denote the shares of
susceptible, infected, and recovered individuals at time t by S(t), I(t), and R(t), respectively.
Each individual chooses a level of activity q(t) to maximize her expected flow payoffs at
time t. The flow payoffs from activity are
q(t)− aq(t)2,
where a > 0. This captures economic and social value from actions that can involve meet-
ing other people, such as going to work or school. The marginal value of these actions is
decreasing, and absent infection individuals will choose the finite level of activity q = 1
2a
. A
susceptible individual pays instantaneous cost C ≥ 0 if infected.
We now describe the infection process. When levels of activity are (qS(t), qI(t), qR(t)), an
individual choosing level of activity rate qi(t) meets susceptible individuals at Poisson rate
qi(t)qS(t)S(t), infected individuals at rate qi(t)qI(t)I(t), and recovered individuals at rate
qi(t)qR(t)R(t).
4 All meetings are independent.
3See also Fenichel et al. (2011), which also focuses on simulations, for related work in epidemiology.
4The model could be extended to allow levels of activity to differ between individuals of the same type.
We omit the details, as assuming individuals of the same type choose the same levels of activity will be
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When a susceptible individual meets an infected individual, she becomes infected with
transmission probability β > 0. Infected individuals recover at Poisson rate κ, and then are
immune in all future periods.5
When C = 0, all individuals choose q(t) = q and the model reduces to the standard SIR
model. For C > 0, the meeting rates between individuals will depend on choices of q(t).
2.2 Equilibrium
A sequence of (symmetric) actions is given by (qS(t), qI(t), qR(t))
∞
t=0.
Recovered individuals know that they are recovered. Susceptible and infected individuals
know that they have not recovered but not whether they are infected, and therefore believe
they are susceptible with probability S(t)
S(t)+I(t)
and infected with probability I(t)
S(t)+I(t)
at time
t. Our interpretation is that infected individuals are pre-symptomatic but can spread the
disease. We will discuss a model with equivalent dynamics which also includes symptomatic
individuals in Remark 1.
Susceptible and infected individuals therefore face the same decision problems. So it will
be without loss of generality to consider sequences of actions such that qS(t) = qI(t) for all
t, and any such sequence is characterized by (qS(t), qR(t))
∞
t=0.
A sequence of actions is an equilibrium if all individuals choose levels of activity to
maximize flow payoffs at all times, given the population distribution and others actions:
Definition 1. An equilibrium given initial conditions (S(0), I(0), R(0)) is a sequence of
actions (qS(t), qR(t))
∞
t=0 such that for all t
qS(t) = argmaxqq − aq2 − CqqS(t)β ·
I(t)S(t)
S(t) + I(t)
and qR(t) = argmaxqq(t)− aq(t)2.
We now explain the infection costs in the definition. An individual i choosing level of
activity qi(t) at time t meets infected individuals at rate qi(t)qS(t)I(t), and meetings with
susceptible and recovered individuals are not relevant for i’s payoffs. If individual i is not yet
without loss of generality.
5Immunity to COVID-19 is not yet well understood; evidence from previous coronaviruses suggests some
immunity is likely but the duration is unclear (Kissler et al., 2020). Our model could be extended to allow
recovered individuals to instead become immune with a probability less than one.
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recovered, then she believes she is susceptible with probability S(t)
S(t)+I(t)
and already infected
otherwise. Since the transmission rate is β, she would be infected by a meeting with an
infected individual at time t with probability β · S(t)
S(t)+I(t)
. The expected rate of infection is
therefore qi(t)qS(t)β · I(t)S(t)S(t)+I(t) , as in the definition above. If the individual is recovered, there
are no infection costs.
Remark 1. Under the quadratic matching assumption, the behavior of recovered individuals
does not effect equilibrium behavior by susceptible individuals or the infection rate. Thus,
our model is equivalent to a number of extensions with additional heterogeneity.
As one example, infected individuals could be replaced by asymptomatic and symp-
tomatic individuals, where symptomatic individuals choose q(t) = 0 to avoid spreading the
disease. In this case, asymptomatic individuals would be come symptomatic at a Poisson
rate. A second example is including a death rate for infected individuals, so that there are
two absorbing states.6
3 Dynamics
Recovered individuals choose qR(t) = q for all t, where q =
1
2a
. Therefore, an equilibrium
is characterized by the level of activity qS(t) ≤ q for susceptible and infected individuals,
which we will refer to as q(t) from now on.
An individual who is susceptible or infected chooses qi(t) to maximize
qi(t)− aqi(t)2 − Cβqi(t)q(t) ·
I(t)S(t)
S(t) + I(t)
.
Taking the first-order condition for qi(t) and substituting qi(t) = q(t), we obtain
q(t) =
1
2a+ Cβ · I(t)S(t)
S(t)+I(t)
(1)
This expression implies that the lexvel of activity q(t) is decreasing in the susceptible pop-
ulation S(t) and the prevalence I(t) (holding other parameters fixed).
6These modifications of course have welfare consequences, but behavior and infection dynamics are equiv-
alent.
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The system is characterized by the differential equations
S˙(t) = −q(t)2βS(t)I(t)
I˙(t) = q(t)2βS(t)I(t)− κI(t)
R˙(t) = κI(t).
We will also be interested in the infection rate ι(t), which is equal to −S˙(t).
When βq2 < κ, the prevalence I(t) is monotonically decreasing for all t even if the cost C
is low. In this case, a small number of cases cannot lead to a larger outbreak. The remainder
of the paper analyzes the case in which the transmission probability is high enough for large
outbreaks to be possible. Formally, all subsequent analysis makes the following assumption:
Assumption 1. High transmissivity: βq2 > κ.
We begin with a basic result about the long-run population.
Proposition 1. Suppose that I(0) > 0 and R(0) < 1. Then limt→∞ I(t) = 0 and limt→∞R(t) ∈
(0, 1).
The proposition says that the disease prevalence eventually approaches zero in a fixed
population with permanent recovery, and that some individuals will never be infected. While
contagion vanishes due to herd immunity, the eventual fraction of the population who has
had the disease depends on behavior and any policy interventions. We define R(∞) =
limt→∞R(t) to be the fraction of the population who is eventually infected, and will discuss
how policy and behavior affect R(∞) below.
Proposition 2. Let
(S(0), I(0), R(0)) = (1− ǫ, ǫ, 0).
Suppose that I(t) ≤ S(t) for all t ≤ t∗ ≤ ∞. For ǫ > 0 sufficiently small, the prevalence I(t)
is single-peaked for t ∈ [0, t∗].
The proposition says that as long as the infected population is not larger than the sus-
ceptible population, the prevalence of the disease is single peaked. Figure 1 shows the path
of the disease and behavior in a simple example.
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Figure 1: Time path of S(t), R(t), and I(t) (top) and q(t) (bottom), with a = 1
4
, C = 5,
β = 1
2
, and κ = 1.
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If the population infected I(t) is much larger than the population infected S(t), then
the prevalence may increase again late in the epidemic. The intuition is that in this case,
most individuals who have not yet recovered are unlikely to be susceptible. Shifting some
individuals from susceptible to infected would further decrease the chance of being suscep-
tible. This mitigates infection risk and leads to more interaction (see Section 4 for similar
effects). The proof gives a necessary condition for this to increase disease prevalence, which
requires I(t) > S(t) but is actually substantially stronger. This effect seems unlikely to
occur in practice, as it would require unusually large prevalences for a severe disease and
relies heavily on purely self-interested behavior.
We can also state single-peakedness results in terms of exogenous parameters, such as
the transmission rate.
Corollary 1. Let
(S(0), I(0), R(0)) = (1− ǫ, ǫ, 0).
If Cβ > 0 is sufficiently small or Cβ is sufficiently large, then the prevalence I(t) is single-
peaked for ǫ > 0 sufficiently small.
The threshold levels of Cβ may depend on a and κ. Similar single-peakedness results
also hold for others parameters, i.e., when a or κ are sufficiently large.
When I(t) is single-peaked, we can ask how exogenous shocks to the number of infected
or recovered individuals affect the eventual fraction of the population R(∞) who has had the
disease. To see this, it is useful to plot the curve (I(t), R(t)) ⊂ R2. Shifting some susceptible
individuals to infected will always shift this curve up, and therefore increase R(∞). Shifting
some susceptible individuals to recovered will shift this curve right, which decreases R(∞)
before the peak prevalence is reached and increases R(∞) after peak prevalence.
To state these observations formally, we consider a baseline time path (S(t), I(t), R(t))
as well as a modified time path (S˜(t), I˜(t), R˜(t)) which includes an exogenous shock at time
t0, but otherwise follows equilibrium dynamics.
Proposition 3. Suppose I(t) is single-peaked. If
(S˜(t0), I˜(t0), R˜(t0)) = (S(t0)− x, I(t0) + x,R(t0)),
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Figure 2: Recovered population over time for C = 0 (blue), C = 1 (red), and C = 5 (yellow),
with a = 1
4
, β = 1
2
, and κ = 1.
then ∂R˜(∞)
∂x
(0) ≥ 0. If
(S˜(t0), I˜(t0), R˜(t0)) = (S(t0)− x, I(t0), R(t0) + x),
then ∂R˜(∞)
∂x
(0) ≤ 0 when I˙(t0) > 0 and ∂R˜(∞)∂x (0) ≥ 0 when I˙(t0) < 0.
Numerical examples suggest, however, that marginal changes in the initial population
have relatively small effects R(∞). So in our model, temporary policy changes early in an
epidemic or even near the peak change the eventual fraction of the population effected, but
the effect size may not be very large. This has several caveats in practice, e.g., the possibility
of eradicating a disease or the arrival of a vaccine.7
By contrast, changes in C lead to large differences in R(∞). For example, let a = 1
4
,
β = 1
2
, and κ = 1 and consider a small initial infection. The eventual fraction infected R(∞)
is 80% with C = 0 but drops to 72% with C = 1 and just 59% with C = 5 (see Figure 2).
7Diseases will not be eradicated in our model for two reasons. The first is that if all individuals choose
q(t) = 0 at some time, there will be a profitable deviation to positive q(t). The second is a technical
consequence of our continuum population model: because recovery occurs at a Poisson rate, we must have
I(t) > 0 for all t as long as I(0) > 0.
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4 Risk Compensation
We next identify a region in which counterintuitive comparative statics occur because in-
creases in infection risk lead to large changes in behavior. We find that a single condition
determines the short-run impacts of changes in infection risk along a number of dimensions.
Definition 2. We say that there are strong behavioral responses at time t if
Cβ · S(t)I(t)
I(t) + S(t)
> 2a. (2)
Strong behavioral responses require a high cost of infection and large populations of
susceptible and infected individuals. We will see that behavioral responses to policies is most
important when these conditions hold. Note that these two conditions can work against each
other, as individuals will interact less in response to costly infections, so such a region will
only exist for diseases that are severe and highly infectious.
4.1 Increased Prevalence
The first consequence of strong behavioral responses is that infection rates are decreasing in
disease prevalence, holding the recovered population fixed. Formally:
Proposition 4. Let (Sx(t), Ix(t), Rx(t)) = (S(t) − x, I(t) + x,R(t)) and let ιx(t) be the
corresponding infection rate. If I(t) < S(t), then
∂ιx(t)
∂x
(0) < 0.
if and only if there are strong behavioral responses at time t.
During severe outbreaks, a larger number of individuals infected near the peak can lead
to more social distancing. The proposition says that this could be large enough to decrease
infection rate.
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Figure 3: Time path of I(t) in blue and 2a−Cβ · S(t)I(t)
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(red), with a = 1
10
, C = 10, β = 1
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,
and κ = 1. There are strong behavioral responses if and only if the red curve is below zero.
The proof shows that
∂ιx(t)
∂x
(0) =
S(t)− I(t)
(2a+ Cβ S(t)I(t)
I(t)+S(t)
)2
· ( 2a︸︷︷︸
direct effect
−Cβ S(t)I(t)
S(t) + I(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
behavioral effect
).
Increasing the disease prevalence has two effects. First, the positive term corresponds to
the direct effect of the change in the infection rate holding behavior fixed, which is positive
whenever I(t) < S(t).8 But second, the negative term corresponds to the effects of the
change in behavior in response to the increased infection. A higher prevalence leads to a
lower level of activity q(t) (when I(t) < S(t)), which lowers the infection rate. Condition (2)
determines whether the behavioral effect is larger than the direct effect. By contrast, the
standard SIR model only captures the direct effect.
Figure 3 gives an example with a = 1
10
, C = 10, β = 1
2
, and κ = 1. The infection path is
shown in blue, and there are strong behavioral responses when the red curve is negative.
8When I(t) > S(t), instead ∂ιx(t)
∂x
(0) > 0 if and only if there are strong behavioral responses at time t.
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4.2 Policy
We next consider comparative in the cost C from infection and the transmission rate β,
which correspond to public-health measures that change the spread of the disease. Our
strong behavioral responses condition again gives the impact of these policies.
Proposition 5. The following are equivalent:
(1) There are strong behavioral responses at time t,
(2) Marginally decreasing β at time t increases ι(t), and
(3) Marginally decreasing C at time t increases Cι(t).
An example of a policy to decrease β is recommending or requiring individuals where
masks. An example of a policy to decrease C is developing a partially effective treatment.
The proposition says that these policies increase short-term infection rates in the same region,
which is characterized by high prevalence and a high cost of infection. Formally, (2) and (3)
state the derivatives
∂ι(t)
∂β
< 0 and
∂(Cι(t))
∂C
< 0
at the initial values of β and C.
The model suggests that considering behavioral responses to public health policies is
most important for severe diseases and close to the peak of outbreaks. When prevalence
is low, public health interventions are most effective on their own. Near the peak, these
interventions will tend to be less effective or even counterproductive unless paired with
campaigns or restrictions to encourage social distancing.
Related models find that partially effective vaccines can increase infection rates (Kremer,
1996) and even decrease welfare (Talamas and Vohra, 2020). We consider these effects in a
dynamic model and obtain a simple expression for when during the course of an outbreak
this would occur.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. We first show that I(t) → 0. If not, we could choose ǫ > 0 and a
sequence t1, t2, . . . such that ti+1 > ti +1 and I(ti) > ǫ. Because infected individuals recover
at a Poisson rate κ, there exists δ > 0 such that if I(t) > ǫ, at least δ individuals recover in
the time interval [t, t + 1]. Thus at least δ individuals recover in perod [ti, ti + 1] for each
i, which gives a contradiction since there is a unit mass of agents who can recover at most
once each.
Let R(∞) = limt→∞R(t). We next show that R(∞) ∈ (0, 1). Because I(0) > 0 and
infected individuals recover at a Poisson rate, R(∞) > 0.
Suppose that R(∞) = 1, so that S(t) → 0. Because q(t) ≤ q for all t, we can bound
R(∞) above by the limit of R(t) when all individuals choose activity q(t) = q for all t:
Lemma 1. Let R(t) be the share of recovered individuals when all individuals choose level
of activity q for all t. Then R(∞) ≤ R(∞).
Proof. Define an infection chain i0, . . . , ik of length k to be a sequence of k individuals such
that i0 is infected at time zero and for each 0 ≤ j < k, individual ij meets individual ij+1
while individual ij is infected. Then R(∞) is equal to the share of agents who are in an
infection chain of length k for any k. So it is sufficient to show that the number of individuals
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in infection chain of length k for any k is weakly higher under level of activity q at all times
compared to q(t).
We claim that for each k, the share of individuals in infection chains of length at most k
is weakly higher under actions q at all times compared to q(t). The proof of the claim is by
induction, and when k = 0 the share is I(0) in both cases.
Suppose the claim holds for k. Consider some individual i who is not in an infection
chain of length at most k. Then i is in an infection chain of length k + 1 if and only if i
meets at least one individual in an infection chain of length at most k while that individual
is infected. By the inductive hypothesis, there are weakly more individuals in an infection
chain of length at most k under actions q at all times compared to q(t). As meetings are
independent, the probability of meeting any such individual is increasing in qi(t) and qI(t)
for all t. So the probability that i is in an infection chain of length k + 1 is weakly higher
under actions q at all times compared to q(t). Therefore, the claim holds for k + 1. This
completes the induction and therefore proves the lemma.
By the lemma, we can assume for the remainder of the argument that q(t) = q for all t.
We then have infection rate S(t)I(t)q2β and recovery rate κI(t).
We claim that S(t)
I(t)
→∞. Because S(t)→ 0 and I(t)→ 0, we can choose at time t0 such
that S(t)q
2β
κ
≤ 1
4
and I(t)q
2β
κ
≤ 1
4
for all t ≥ t0. Then for all t ≥ t0, we have S˙(t) ≥ −κ4S(t)
by the first inequality and I˙(t) ≤ −κ
2
I(t) by the second inequality. In particular, I(t)
exponentially decays at a faster rate than S(t). Since S(t0) and I(t0) are positive, this
proves the claim.
We can therefore choose t1 such that S(t) > I(t) for all t ≥ t1 and S(t)I(t)q2β < 12κ for
all t ≥ t1. Given an individual i who is infected at time t ≥ t0, the second inequality implies
that the expected number of susceptible individuals whom i infects is less than 1
2
. Therefore,
the total number of individuals who become infected at times t ≥ t0 is less than
I(t0)
∞∑
k=1
1
2k
= I(t0) < S(t0).
This contradicts our assumption that S(t)→ 0, so we must have R(∞) < 1.
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Proof of Proposition 2. The population shares (S(t), I(t), R(t)) and q(t) are continuous, so
I˙(t) is continuous as well.
We first show that for ǫ sufficiently small, I˙(0) > 0. By Assumption 1 (high transmissiv-
ity), q2β > κ. Because q(0) is a continuous function of (S(t), I(t), R(t)) with q(0) = q when
I(t) = 0, it follows that
(1− ǫ)q(0)2β > κ
for ǫ > 0 sufficiently small. Since I˙(0) = ǫ(1 − ǫ)q(0)2β − ǫκ, the prevalence is initially
increasing for ǫ sufficiently small.
Let tpeak be the first time at which I˙(t) = 0.9 We will show that I˙(t) < 0 on (tpeak, t∗)
whenever S(t) > I(t) on (tpeak, t∗).
We first claim that I¨(tpeak) < 0. Let
(S(t), I(t), R(t)) = (S(tpeak)− x, I(tpeak), R(tpeak) + x).
The infection rate is ι(t) = q(t)2S(t)I(t)β, and from equation (1)
q(t) =
1
2a+ Cβ · I(t)S(t)
S(t)+I(t)
⇒ ∂q(t)
∂x
= − 1
(2a + Cβ · I(t)S(t)
S(t)+I(t)
)2
· I(t)
2
(S(t) + I(t))2
.
So the derivative of the infection rate in x is
∂ι(t)
∂x
= q(t)βI(t)
(
q(t) + 2
∂q(t)
∂x
S(t)
)
=
q(t)βI(t)
(2a+ Cβ · S(t)I(t)
S(t)+I(t)
)2
((
2a+ Cβ · S(t)I(t)(S(t) + I(t))
(S(t) + I(t))2
)
− 2Cβ · S(t)I(t)
2
(S(t) + I(t))2
)
=
q(t)βI(t)
(2a+ Cβ · S(t)I(t)
S(t)+I(t)
)2
(
2a + Cβ · S(t)
(S(t) + I(t))2
· (S(t)− I(t))
)
.
We will need that the right-hand side is positive, which holds whenever S(t) > I(t).
Since I˙(tpeak) = 0 while S˙(tpeak) = −R˙(tpeak) = ι(tpeak), the derivative above implies that
the derivative of the infection rate ι˙(tpeak) < 0. Since the time derivative of the recovery rate
is κI˙(tpeak) = 0, the claim I¨(tpeak) < 0 holds.
9If there is no such t < t∗, then t∗ is the peak.
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Similarly, suppose that I˙(t) = 0 for some t ∈ (tpeak, t∗). The same argument shows that
I¨(t) < 0 at time t. So I(t) is strictly decreasing on [tpeak, t∗].
Proof of Corollary 1. We treat the two cases of Cβ small and Cβ large separately.
Cβ small: By the proof of Proposition 2, I(t) is single-peaked if ǫ is sufficiently small
and
2a+ Cβ · S(t)
(S(t) + I(t))2
· (S(t)− I(t)) > 0
for all t.
We claim the expression − S(t)I(t)
(S(t)+I(t))2
is bounded below by a constant M independent of
C and β (but potentially depending on a and κ). Indeed, S(t)I(t) is bounded above by one.
The expression S(t) + I(t) is bounded below by the value of 1 − R(∞) when β = 1 and
C = 0, so that q(t) = q for all t (Lemma 1). Since 1 − R(∞) > 0 by Proposition 1, this
proves the claim.
We conclude that whenever Cβ < 2a
M
, the prevalence I(t) is single-peaked for ǫ sufficiently
small.
Cβ large: We next consider Cβ large, and will show that for any Cβ sufficiently large,
we have I(t) < S(t) for all t when ǫ is small enough. As above, we can bound 1 − R(∞)
below by a positive constant, which we call N .
Let δ < N/2. We will show that for Cβ sufficiently large and ǫ < δ/2, we have I(t) < δ
for all t. If not, there must exist some time t0 at which δ/2 < I(t0) < δ and I˙(t0) > 0.
Since I(t0) + S(t0) ≥ N , I(t0) < δ, and δ < N/2, we have S(t0) > I(t0). Therefore,
I(t0)S(t0)
S(t0)+I(t0)
≥ I(t0)
2
≥ δ
4
. Recall that q(t) = 1
2a+Cβ·
I(t)S(t)
S(t)+I(t)
. So taking Cβ sufficiently large, we
can assume that q(t0) <
√
κ. Then
I˙(t0) = I(t0)
(
S(t0)
I(t0) + S(t0)
q(t0)
2β − κ
)
≤ I(t0)(q(t0)2 − κ) < 0.
But this contradicts our assumption that I˙(t0) > 0.
We have shown I(t) < δ for all t. Since I(t) + S(t) ≥ N > 2δ for all t, we must have
I(t) < S(t) for all t as desired. We now apply Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 3. We compare the curves (I(t), R(t)) and (I˜(t), R˜(t)) in R2. For each
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comparative static, there will be two cases depending on whether these curves intersect after
the shock.
To carry out this comparison, we first note that the function R(t) is continuous and
strictly increasing with image [R(0), R(∞)). So for each r ∈ [R(0), R(∞)), the inverse
R−1(r) is unique.
Consider a shock at time t0. First, let (S˜(t0), I˜(t0), R˜(t0)) = (S(t0)−x, I(t0)+x,R(t0)) for
x > 0. For each r ∈ [R(t0), R(∞)), the inverse R−1(r) is the time at which R(t) = r. We can
compare I(R−1(r)) to I˜(R˜−1(r)). Since I˜(t0) > I(t0), we either have I(R
−1(r)) = I˜(R˜−1(r))
for some r > R(t0) or I(R
−1(r)) > I˜(R˜−1(r)) for all r ∈ [R(t0), R(∞)).
If I(R−1(r)) = I˜(R˜−1(r)) for some r > R(t0), then the dynamics of (S˜(t), I˜(t), R˜(t))
beginning at time R˜−1(r) are the same as the dynamics of (S(t), I(t), R(t)) beginning at
time R−1(r), so R˜(∞) = R(∞). If I(R−1(r)) > I˜(R˜−1(r)) for all r ∈ [R(t0), R(∞)), then
R˜(∞) ≥ R(∞) by continuity of R(t).
Next, let (S˜(t0), I˜(t0), R˜(t0)) = (S(t0) − x, I(t0), R(t0) + x) for x > 0 arbitrarily small.
There exists a time t1 at which R(t1)) = R˜(t0). If I˙(t0) > 0, then I˜(t0) < I(t1). So we
either have I(R−1(r)) = I˜(R˜−1(r)) for some r > R(t1) or I(R
−1(r)) < I˜(R˜−1(r)) for all
r ∈ [R(t1), R(∞)). As in the previous paragraph, we can conclude that R˜(∞) ≤ R(∞).
If I˙(t0) < 0, then I˜(t0) > I(t1). So we either have I(R
−1(r)) = I˜(R˜−1(r)) for some
r > R(t1) or I(R
−1(r)) > I˜(R˜−1(r)) for all r ∈ [R(t1), R(∞)). As in the previous cases, we
can conclude that R˜(∞) ≥ R(∞).
Proof of Proposition 4. Let qx(t) be the equilibrium action given (Sx(t), Ix(t), Rx(t)). The
infection rate is ιx(t) = qx(t)
2Sx(t)Ix(t)β, and from equation (1)
qx(t) =
1
2a+ Cβ · Ix(t)Sx(t)
Sx(t)+Ix(t)
.
As x varies, Sx(t) + Ix(t) remains constant while
∂(Sx(t)Ix(t))
∂x
(0) = I(t)− S(t).
Differentiating the infection rate,
∂ιx(t)
∂x
(0) = q(t)2(I(t)− S(t))β + 2q(t)
(
∂qx(t)
∂x
(0)
)
S(t)I(t)β.
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The right-hand side has the same sign as q(t)(I(t)− S(t)) + 2
(
∂qx(t)
∂x
(0)
)
S(t)I(t). Differen-
tiating qx(t), (
∂qx(t)
∂x
(0)
)
= −
Cβ · I(t)−S(t)
S(t)+I(t)(
2a + Cβ · I(t)S(t)
S(t)+I(t)
)2 .
Substituting,
q(t) + 2
(
∂qx(t)
∂x
(0)
)
β =
I(t)− S(t)(
2a+ Cβ · I(t)S(t)
S(t)+I(t)
)2 ·
(
2a− Cβ · I(t)S(t)
S(t) + I(t)
)
.
Suppose I(t) < S(t). The right-hand side is negative if and only if 2a − Cβ · I(t)S(t)
S(t)+I(t)
< 0,
which is the definition of a strong behavioral response at t.
Proof of Proposition 5. We will again use our formula for the infection rate ι(t) = q(t)2S(t)I(t)β
and equation (1) for q(t).
(1) ⇔ (2): Differentiating the infection rate,
∂ι(t)
∂β
= q(t)2S(t)I(t) + 2q(t)
∂q(t)
∂β
S(t)I(t)β.
The right-hand side has the same sign as q(t) + 2∂q(t)
∂β
β. Differentiating q(t),
∂q(t)
∂β
= −
Cβ · I(t)S(t)
S(t)+I(t)(
2a+ Cβ · I(t)S(t)
S(t)+I(t)
)2 .
Substituting,
q(t) + 2
∂q(t)
∂β
β =
1(
2a+ Cβ · I(t)S(t)
S(t)+I(t)
)2 ·
(
2a− Cβ · I(t)S(t)
S(t) + I(t)
)
.
The right-hand side is negative if and only if 2a− Cβ · I(t)S(t)
S(t)+I(t)
< 0, which is the definition
of a strong behavioral response at t.
(2) ⇔ (3): Because C is constant, the infection rate ι(t) is decreasing in β if and only
if Cι(t) is decreasing in β. In our expression for Cι(t), the terms C and β only within the
product Cβ. So Cι(t) is decreasing in β if and only if it is decreasing in C.
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